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OPTIMAL RISK ALLOCATION IN REINSURANCE NETWORKS
NICOLE BA¨UERLE∗ AND ALEXANDER GLAUNER†
Abstract. In this paper we consider reinsurance or risk sharing from a macroeconomic point
of view. Our aim is to find socially optimal reinsurance treaties. In our setting we assume that
there are n insurance companies each bearing a certain risk and one representative reinsurer. The
optimization problem is to minimize the sum of all capital requirements of the insurers where we
assume that all insurance companies use a form of Range-Value-at-Risk. We show that in case
all insurers use Value-at-Risk and the reinsurer’s premium principle satisfies monotonicity, then
layer reinsurance treaties are socially optimal. For this result we do not need any dependence
structure between the risks. In the general setting with Range-Value-at-Risk we obtain again
the optimality of layer reinsurance treaties under further assumptions, in particular under the
assumption that the individual risks are positively dependent through the stochastic ordering.
Our results include the findings in [12] in the special case n = 1. At the end, we discuss the
difference between socially optimal reinsurance treaties and individually optimal ones by looking
at a number of special cases.
Key words : Optimal reinsurance, Range-Value-at-Risk, Positively dependent
through stochastic ordering
1. Introduction and Motivation
Finding the optimal form of a reinsurance treaty or in more general terms, optimizing risk
sharing, is an old topic which regained a lot of attention in recent years. One of the first starting
points has been [5] who proved that a stop-loss reinsurance treaty minimizes the retained loss
of the insurer given the reinsurance premium is calculated with the expected value principle. A
similar result has been derived in [2] where the expected utility of terminal wealth of the insurer
has been maximized. Since then a lot of generalizations of this problem have been considered.
We refer the interested reader to the recent book [1] which contains a comprehensive literature
overview in chapter 8 and to [14]. We will here only mention a few recent articles which are
relevant for our study. First in [6] a characterization of optimal reinsurance forms for a general
class of risk measures has been given by exploiting duality theory in functional analysis. A stop-
loss treaty turned out to be optimal when the premium principle is an expected value principle.
Further [12] considered the optimization problem with Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall and
a general premium principle for the insurer. They obtain the optimality of a layer-reinsurance.
While most publications consider the problem only from the perspective of the individual
insurer, we investigate the situation from an economic point of view. More precisely, we want to
know what kind of risk sharing between insurers and reinsurer is optimal for the entire economy
and in which situations is it identical to the individually optimal decision of the insurer? This
question also makes it necessary to address the task of modelling the problem for a random vector
representing the individual risks taken by the insurers. There exists of course a rich literature
on risk sharing problems where random vectors are involved. The most popular problem is the
so-called inf-convolution problem which is given by
min
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) s.t. X1 + . . .+Xn = X
where ρi are suitable risk measures. It has been shown in [16] that for law- and cash-invariant
convex risk measures a solution always exists and is given by a comonotone structure. This result
c©0000 (copyright holder)
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has been refined by [15] where it has been shown that if the risk measures are given by Range-
Value-at-Risk, there is an explicit construction for the optimal solution. In [17] this problem
has been interpreted in a setting with several insurers with general convex risk measures and
premium principles. There, optimal reinsurance contracts have been characterized by means of
subdifferential formulas in Banach spaces. For more results on the inf-convolution problem we
refer the reader to [22].
Problems where special kinds of risk sharing between two entities are considered can be found
e.g. in [3]. There, the insurance group allocates the total risk between two entities which are
subject to different regulatory capital requirements, using appropriate risk transfer agreements.
The optimal risk sharing rule is derived explicitly for special risk measures like Value-at-Risk
and Expected Shortfall. In [9] the authors develop optimal reinsurance contracts that minimize
the convex combination of the Value-at-Risk of the insurer’s loss and the reinsurer’s loss under
some constraints. Some explicit, though rather complicated optimal reinsurance treaties are
obtained there. Next, [11] investigate the optimal form of reinsurance from the perspective of
an insurer when he decides to cede parts of the loss to two reinsurers, where both reinsurers
calculate the premium according to different premium principles. The problem is solved under
the criterion of minimizing Value-at-Risk or Expected Shortfall. An optimal reinsurance treaty is
to cede two adjacent layers of the risk. Another multivariate problem is considered in [25] where
optimal reinsurance strategies for an insurer with multiple lines of business are investigated under
the criterion of minimizing the total capital requirement calculated based on the multivariate
lower-orthant Value-at-Risk. The optimal strategy for the insurer there is to buy a two-layer
reinsurance treaty for each line of business. Note that the dependence structure for the individual
risks was not important for the results cited so far. A worst case scenario w.r.t. the dependence
structure has been considered in [10] where the problem of optimal reinsurance treaties for
multivariate risks with general law-invariant convex risk measures has been studied. It turned
out that stop-loss reinsurance treaties minimize a general law-invariant convex risk measure of
the total retained risk. In [13] it has been assumed that an insurer has n lines of business
which can be reinsured subject to a given premium and the aim is to minimize the expected
convex function of the retained total risk. In order to derive results in this setting the authors
needed a concept for positive dependence between risks which has been the concept of ’positively
dependent through the stochastic ordering’.
Papers with a more economic point of view on optimal reinsurance are among others [23]
where a Stackelberg equilibrium for n reinsurers under special assumptions is considered and
[21] where a game-theoretic analysis of optimal insurance networks has been conducted.
The aim of this paper now is to consider reinsurance or risk sharing from a macroeconomic
point of view. Whereas the individual goal of an insurance company is to reduce risk exposure
and own capital requirements by reinsurance, the social goal of reinsurance is to spread risk
around the globe by avoiding local overexposures. This construction also increases the amount
of risk which can be insured. In our setting we assume that there are n insurance companies,
each bearing a certain risk, and one representative reinsurer. In contrast to the inf-convolution
problem the situation is no longer symmetric. The optimization problem then is to minimize
the sum of all capital requirements of the insurers. We assume that all insurance companies
use Range-Value-at-Risk as a risk measure with possibly different parameters. Range-Value-at-
Risk comprises Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall and is thus a natural choice with practical
relevance. We show that in case all insurers use Value-at-Risk and the reinsurer’s premium
principle satisfies monotonicity, then layer reinsurance treaties are socially optimal. For this
result we do not need any dependence structure between the risks. In the general setting
with Range-Value-at-Risk we obtain again the optimality of layer reinsurance treaties under the
assumption that the reinsurer’s premium principle is consistent with the increasing convex order
(which most premium principles are) and under the assumption that the individual risks are
positively dependent through the stochastic ordering (PDS). Our results include the findings in
[12] in the special case n = 1. Finally, we also discuss the difference between socially optimal
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reinsurance treaties and individually optimal ones. Fortunately, they coincide in many cases but
there also may be some differences.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section we summarize some definitions and
facts from risk measures, stochastic orders and dependence concepts. In particular we prove
that PDS random vectors carry the increasing convex order of the margins over to the sum of
the components. In Section 3 we introduce and discuss our optimization problem. The solution
of the problem is then presented in Section 4 where also some special cases are discussed. In
the last section we investigate the difference between socially optimal reinsurance treaties and
individually optimal ones by looking at a number of special cases.
2. Risk Measures, Stochastic Orders and Dependence Structures
We will consider non-negative random variables X : Ω → R+ defined on a non-atomic
probability space (Ω,A,P). They represent future insurance claims, i.e. X(ω) ≥ 0 is the
discounted net loss of an insurance company at the end of a fixed period due to a policy
(or portfolio of policies) sold by them. We denote the (cumulative) distribution function by
FX(x) := P(X ≤ x), the survival function by SX(x) := 1 − FX(x) and the generalized inverse
by F−1X (α) := inf{x ∈ R : FX(x) ≥ α} where x ∈ R and α ∈ [0, 1]. With
L1 := {X : Ω→ R+ : X is a random variable with E[X] <∞}
we denote the space of all such non-negative, integrable random variables. We now recall some
notions of risk measures. In general, a risk measure is a mapping ρ : L1 → R¯. Essentially, the
notion of a premium principle pi : L1 → R¯ is mathematically equivalent but applications are
different. While the former determines the necessary solvency capital to bear a risk, the latter
gives the price of (re)insuring it. The properties of risk measures discussed in the sequel apply
to premium principles analogously. Of particular importance are the following risk measures.
Definition 2.1. For α, β ∈ [0, 1] and X ∈ L1 with distribution function FX we define
a) the Value-at-Risk of X at level α as V aRα(X) := F
−1
X (1− α).
b) the Expected Shortfall of X at level β > 0 as ESβ(X) :=
1
β
∫ β
0 V aRs(X)ds.
c) the Range-Value-at-Risk of X at level α, β if α+ β ≤ 1 as
RV aRα,β(X) :=
{
1
β
∫ α+β
α V aRs(X)ds, β > 0
V aRα(X), β = 0.
Obviously, Range-Value-at-Risk comprises both Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall.
A risk measure ρ should have some nice properties like for example
i) law-invariance: ρ(X) depends only on the distribution FX .
ii) monotonicity: If X ≤ Y then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
iii) translation invariance: For m ∈ R it holds ρ(X +m) = ρ(X) +m.
iv) positive homogeneity: For α ≥ 0 it holds that ρ(αX) = αρ(X).
v) subadditivity: ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
vi) convexity: For α ∈ [0, 1] it holds that ρ(αX + (1− α)Y ) ≤ αρ(X) + (1− α)ρ(Y ).
Though Value-at-Risk is in general not subadditive it has a lot of nice properties like law-
invariance, monotonicity, translation invariance and positive homogeneity. These properties are
also shared by Range-Value-at-Risk. The following facts, which can be directly derived from the
definition, will be important for us:
Proposition 2.2. For α ∈ [0, 1] and X ∈ L1 we obtain:
a) α→ V aRα(X) is decreasing in α.
b) For any non-decreasing, left-continuous function t : R → R it holds V aRα(t(X)) =
t
(
V aRα(X)
)
.
For the solution of our optimization problem we make use of the following notions of stochastic
orderings.
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Definition 2.3. Let X,Y be two random variables. Then X is less than Y in
(a) usual stochastic order (X ≤st Y ) if E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for all increasing f : R→ R,
(b) convex order (X ≤cx Y ) if E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for all convex f : R→ R,
(c) increasing convex order (X ≤icx Y ) if E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for all increasing convex
f : R→ R,
whenever the expectations exist.
The following characterizations of the increasing convex order are well-known (see e.g. [20],
chap. 1)
Proposition 2.4. Let X,Y be two random variables with distribution functions FX , FY .
a) X ≤icx Y holds if and only if E[(X − t)]+ ≤ E[(Y − t)]+ for all t ∈ R.
b) X ≤icx Y holds if and only if there exists another random variable Z with X ≤st Z ≤cx Y.
c) Let t0 ∈ R such that FX(t) ≤ FY (t) for t < t0, FX(t) ≥ FY (t) for t ≥ t0 and E[X] ≤ E[Y ]
then X ≤icx Y .
From now on we will restrict to law-invariant risk measures.
Definition 2.5. We say that a law-invariant risk measure ρ is consistent
a) with the usual stochastic order if X ≤st Y implies ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
a) with the increasing convex order if X ≤icx Y implies ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
It is well-known (see e.g. [7], Theorem 4.2) that on non-atomic probability spaces monotonicity
of the risk measure is enough to imply consistency w.r.t. the usual stochastic ordering and the
additional property of convexity of the risk measure is enough to imply consistency w.r.t. the
increasing convex ordering (see e.g. [7], Theorem 4.4). Hence a large class of risk measures
satisfy these consistency properties. We also have to recall the concept of a copula for random
vectors.
Definition 2.6. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a random vector with distribution function F and
marginal distribution functions F1, . . . , Fn. An n-dimensional distribution function C with uni-
form marginals on [0, 1] is called a copula of X if
F (x1, . . . , xn) = C (F1(x1), . . . , Fn(xn)) , (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn.
One important example of a copula is the so-called Fre´chet-Hoeffding bound which is given
by
C(x1, . . . , xn) = min{x1, . . . , xn}.
The following observation will be crucial for us. It is implied by the definition of the copula.
Corollary 2.7. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a random vector with copula C and t1, . . . , tn be
increasing and continuous functions. Then the random vector
(t1(X1), . . . , tn(Xn))
also has copula C.
A random vector which possesses as copula the Fre´chet-Hoeffding bound is called comonotonic.
Definition 2.8. A risk measure ρ is called comonotone additive if for all random vectors X =
(X1, . . . , Xn) which are comonotonic we have that
ρ
( n∑
i=1
Xi
)
=
n∑
i=1
ρ(Xi).
The next result follows directly from [19], Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 2.9. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) be two random vectors with a
common copula C. Then Xi ≤st Yi, i = 1, . . . , n implies
∑n
i=1Xi ≤st
∑n
i=1 Yi.
Finally we need a concept of positive dependence.
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Definition 2.10. The random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is said to be
(a) positively dependent through the stochastic ordering (PDS) if for all i = 1, . . . , n
E[f(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn)|Xi = xi]
is increasing in xi for any (componentwise) increasing function f : Rn−1 → R.
(b) positive orthant dependent (POD) if both
P(X ≤ x) ≥
n∏
i=1
P(Xi ≤ xi) and P(X > x) ≥
n∏
i=1
P(Xi > xi)
holds for all x ∈ Rn.
Obviously, PDS and POD are properties of the copula. PDS is less well-known than other
dependence concepts like e.g. conditionally increasing (CI) or MTP2. In [8] Theorem 5.3 it is
shown that CI implies PDS. For n = 2 the two conditions in Definition 2.10 (b) are equivalent.
If for n > 2 only the first or the second one holds, X is referred to as positive lower or upper
orthant depended respectively. PDS implies POD, cf. [8] Theorem 5.1. To the best of our
knowledge, POD is even the smallest established superclass of PDS.
We need the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.11. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) be two random vectors with a
common PDS copula C. Then Xi ≤icx Yi, i = 1, . . . , n implies
∑n
i=1Xi ≤icx
∑n
i=1 Yi.
Proof. According to Proposition 2.4 b) there exist random variables Zi such that Xi ≤st Zi ≤cx
Yi for i = 1, . . . , n. Let them be the marginals of a random vector Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) with copula
C. From Theorem 2.9 it follows that
∑n
i=1Xi ≤st
∑n
i=1 Zi and from Corollary 3.5 in [13] it
follows that
∑n
i=1 Zi ≤cx
∑n
i=1 Yi. Hence the statement is again obtained with Proposition 2.4
b). 
A common PDS copula is the mildest possible assumption to obtain this result. The next
example shows that weakening the dependence concept to POD is not possible. It is a simplified
version of Example 4.7 in [19], who used it in a slightly different context.
Example 2.12. Let n = 2. We define the distribution of the random vector Y = (Y1, Y2) by its
discrete density
P(Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2) y2 = 0 y2 = 1 y2 = 3 y2 = 4
y1 = 0
3
12 0
2
12
1
12
y1 = 1
1
12
2
12 0
3
12
It is readily checked that Y is POD. However, it is not PDS since
P(Y1 > 0|Y2 = 1) = 1 > 0 = P(Y1 > 0|Y2 = 3).
Let us define an increasing function f by f(0) = 0, f(1) = f(3) = 2, f(4) = 4 and set
X = (Y1, f(Y2)). Then, X and Y have the same copula, cf. Corollary 2.7. Furthermore, it
follows from Proposition 2.4 c) that Xi ≤icx Yi, i = 1, 2 but Y1 + Y2 ≤icx X1 +X2.
3. The Optimization Problem
We consider an economy with n insurance companies, numbered consecutively i = 1, . . . , n,
and a single reinsurance company. The single reinsurer is justified by the study in [4]. It is
assumed that insurer i bears a total risk modelled by a non-negative random variable Xi ∈ L1.
These risks are interpreted as discounted losses at the end of a fixed period due to insurance
claims based on policies sold by the respective insurer. Note that these risks are not neces-
sarily independent. Each insurer i evaluates its risk with a translation invariant and positive
homogeneous risk measure ρi which will be specified later on.
In order to reduce the risk borne autonomously, insurance company i may cede a portion
fi(Xi) to the reinsurer. The retained risk is then given by Rfi(Xi) = Xi − fi(Xi). We assume
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that f1, . . . , fn : R+ → R+ are increasing and that fi(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ R+ and all i = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, in order to rule out moral hazard, the retained loss functions Rf1 , . . . , Rfn : R+ → R+
are assumed to be increasing as well. We define the set of admissible ceded loss functions by
C = {f : R+ → R+| f(x) ≤ x ∀x ∈ R+ and f,Rf are increasing}.
Note that functions in C are in particular Lipschitz-continuous, since Rf increasing leads to
f(x2) − f(x1) ≤ x2 − x1 for all 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2. Given all ceded risks, the reinsurer prices their
sum with a premium principle pi : L1 → R¯ to take account of the dependence structure of the
individual risks. The reinsurer then determines the amount to be paid by each insurer with a
premium allocation rule.
Definition 3.1. For a given premium principle pi and aggregate ceded risk Y, a linear functional
ψpi(·, Y ) : L1 → R¯ with ψpi(Y, Y ) = pi(Y ) is called premium allocation rule.
That is, insurer i has to pay the reinsurance premium ψpi
(
fi(Xi),
∑n
j=1 fj(Xj)
)
. The setting
is illustrated in Figure 1.
X1 X2
X6 RI X3
X5 X4
Figure 1. The optimal reinsurance problem in an economy with one reinsurer
and n insurers. Insurer i cedes fi(Xi) of his original risk Xi.
We are interested in a risk allocation which is macroeconomically optimal, i.e. which minimizes
the aggregate capital requirement of all insurers. An insurance company’s solvency (or risk)
capital provides protection against insolvency due to large unexpected losses. Given that all
capital requirements are representative for the borne risks, such an optimal allocation can be
seen as desirable state of the economy with respect to financial stability. While Xi models
insurer i’s discounted loss due to insurance claims, the discounted net loss after reinsurance at
the end of the fixed period is given by the retained loss less the insurer’s premium income pii(Xi)
in the period plus cost of reinsurance and cost of capital:
Lossi = Rfi(Xi)− pii(Xi) + ψpi
(
fi(Xi),
n∑
j=1
fj(Xj)
)
+ rCoC · ρi(Lossi). (3.1)
Cost of capital is defined as some cost of capital rate rCoC times the capital requirement
ρi(Lossi). We assume a uniform cost of capital rate rCoC for all insurance companies. The
implicit description of the net loss (3.1) goes back to [18]. Applying ρi on both sides and using
translation invariance and positive homogeneity, one obtains as capital requirement of insurer i
ρi(Lossi) =
1
1− rCoC
ρi(Rfi(Xi))− pii(Xi) + ψpi(fi(Xi), n∑
j=1
fj(Xj)
) .
Hence, the minimization objective becomes
min
n∑
i=1
ρi(Lossi) s.t. f1, . . . , fn ∈ C. (3.2)
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As a strictly monotone transformation of the objective function it is sufficient to consider the
sum of the capital requirements for the retained risks plus the total reinsurance premium
n∑
i=1
ρi(Rfi(Xi))+ ψpi(fi(Xi), n∑
j=1
fj(Xj)
) = n∑
i=1
ρi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
+ pi
(
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
.
Therefore, we will study the optimal reinsurance problem
min
n∑
i=1
ρi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
+ pi
(
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
s.t. f1, . . . , fn ∈ C. (3.3)
In what follows we assume that the insurance companies use Range-Value-at-Risk as risk mea-
sure, i.e. for i = 1, . . . , n it holds ρi = RV aRαi,βi , where αi, βi ≥ 0 such that 0 < αi + βi ≤ 1.
As a superclass of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall, the two most widely used risk mea-
sures in the financial industry, Range-Value-at-Risk is a natural choice to obtain results which
cover most cases of practical relevance. Note that we require the sum of the parameters to be
strictly positive to avoid the case of an infinite capital requirement.
4. Reduction to an Optimization Problem with finite Dimension
4.1. Case 1: Insurers use Value-at-Risk. In this section we consider the special case that
all insurers use Value-at-Risk, that is, β1 = · · · = βn = 0. So let ρi = V aRαi with αi ∈ (0, 1].
Moreover, for the premium principle of the reinsurer we assume
(A1): The reinsurer’s premium principle is consistent with the usual stochastic order, that
is, pi(X) ≤ pi(Y ) whenever X ≤st Y for X,Y ∈ L1.
For reducing (3.3) to finite dimension, the following class of reinsurance treaties (i.e. ceded
loss functions) plays a key role.
Definition 4.1. The function f : R+ → R+ given by
f(x) = min{(x− a)+, b} = (x− a)+ − (x− (a+ b))+, a, b ≥ 0
is called layer reinsurance treaty with deductible a and upper bound b. In the degenerate case
b =∞
f(x) = (x− a)+
is referred to as stop-loss reinsurance treaty.
Note that all such functions belong to C. Economically, layer reinsurance means that the
reinsurer covers all losses exceeding the deductible but limits its liability to a maximum b. The
idea how to reduce (3.3) to finite dimension is to construct layer reinsurances which are at least
as good as given, arbitrary ceded loss functions with respect to the objective function value.
For each insurer i = 1, . . . , n let a ceded loss function fi ∈ C be given and define hfi : R+ → R+
by
hfi(x) = min
{(
x− (V aRαi(Xi)− fi(V aRαi(Xi))))
+
, fi(V aRαi(Xi))
}
. (4.1)
These are layer reinsurance treaties with deductibles
(
V aRαi(Xi)− fi(V aRαi(Xi))
)
and upper
bounds fi(V aRαi(Xi)). It holds hfi ∈ C for i = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 4.2. Assume (A1) and let f1, . . . , fn ∈ C be arbitrary ceded loss functions. Then
n∑
i=1
V aRαi
(
Rhfi (Xi)
)
+ pi
( n∑
i=1
hfi(Xi)
)
≤
n∑
i=1
V aRαi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
+ pi
( n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
.
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Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be arbitrary. By inserting we get hfi(V aRαi(Xi)) = fi(V aRαi(Xi)).
The functions hfi , fi are in C and therefore Rhfi , Rfi are increasing and continuous. Thus, the
properties of V aRαi (see Proposition 2.2) imply
V aRαi
(
Rhfi (Xi)
)
= Rhfi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
)
= V aRαi(Xi)− hfi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
)
= V aRαi(Xi)− fi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
)
= Rfi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
)
= V aRαi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
. (4.2)
Now, we show hfi(x) ≤ fi(x) for all x ∈ R+. Since Rfi is increasing it follows for all x ≤
V aRαi(Xi) that
fi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
)− fi(x) ≤ V aRαi(Xi)− x.
Rearranging and using that fi ≥ 0 gives
fi(x) ≥
(
x− V aRαi(Xi) + fi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
))
+
= hfi(x),
where the equality holds due to x ≤ V aRαi(Xi). For x ≥ V aRαi(Xi) we have
hfi(x) = fi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
) ≤ fi(x),
since fi is increasing. Hence, we have shown hfi(x) ≤ fi(x) for all x ∈ R+ which in turn implies
hfi(Xi) ≤st fi(Xi). (4.3)
As i was arbitrary, Theorem 2.9 yields
n∑
i=1
hfi(Xi) ≤st
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi).
By (A1) it follows
pi
( n∑
i=1
hfi(Xi)
)
≤ pi
( n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
. (4.4)
(4.2) and (4.4) together yield the assertion. 
Theorem 4.3. Let all insurers use Value-at-Risk with parameters α1, . . . , αn and assume (A1).
Regardless of the dependence structure between their individual risks X1, . . . , Xn the optimal
reinsurance problem (3.3) has the same optimal value as the finite dimensional problem
min
n∑
i=1
ai + pi
( n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}
)
s.t. 0 ≤ ai ≤ V aRαi(Xi),∀i.
(4.5)
Furthermore, if a1, . . . , an is an optimal solution to (4.5) then
fi(x) = min{(x− ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}, i = 1, . . . , n
is an optimal solution to (3.3).
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai ≤ V aRαi(Xi) and
fi(x) = min{(x− ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}.
Then fi ∈ C and since V aRαi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
= Rfi
(
V aRαi(Xi)
)
= ai the target function in (3.3)
reduces to (4.5). Hence we have that the minimum value of (4.5) is at least as large as that of
(3.3). On the other hand, Proposition 4.2 yields that the minimum value of (3.3) is at least as
large as that of (4.5). Hence, the optimal values are equal and the statement follows. 
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Remark 4.4. Note that in the setting of Theorem 4.3 an optimal solution always exists when
pi is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. the supremum norm. This is due to the fact that the target
function is then Lipschitz-continuous w.r.t. any norm of Rn and minimized over a compact
set. The existence of a factor λ > 0 such that λpi becomes translation invariant is a sufficient
condition for the Lipschitz-continuity of pi. Moreover, note that the random variables which
appear as an argument of pi are bounded.
4.2. Case 2: Insurers use a general Range-Value-at-Risk. This section covers the general
case when at least one insurance company uses Range-Value-at-Risk with a positive parameter
β. Hence, there is an l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
ρi = RV aRαi,βi , βi > 0, i = 1, . . . , l
ρi = RV aRαi,βi = V aRαi , βi = 0, i = l + 1, . . . , n.
In this case we need stronger assumptions, in particular an assumption about the dependence
structure of the individual risks. If these risks show some kind of negative dependence then
obviously it is preferable to concentrate these risks in the reinsurer’s portfolio. More interesting
and maybe more realistic is the case of some kind of positive dependence. It arises for example
as a result of natural catastrophes. Here we assume
(A2): The reinsurer’s premium principle is consistent with the increasing convex order,
that is, pi(X) ≤ pi(Y ) whenever X ≤icx Y for X,Y ∈ L1.
(A3): The random vector X := (X1, . . . , Xn) has a PDS copula.
Let f1, . . . , fn ∈ C be given ceded loss functions of the insurers. For all i = 1, . . . , n define the
layer reinsurance treaty kfi : R+ → R+,
kfi(x) = min
{(
x− (V aRαi+βi(Xi)− fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi))))
+
,Mi
}
, (4.6)
where Mi ∈ [fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi)), fi(V aRαi(Xi))] is chosen such that
RV aRαi,βi(fi(Xi)) = RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)).
Note that kfi ∈ C for i = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 4.5. The layer reinsurance treaty kfi is well-defined for all i = 1, . . . , n. Besides,
for i > l it is identical with the layer reinsurance treaty hfi of Section 4.1.
Proof. For kfi to be well-defined we have to show thatMi ∈ [fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi)), fi(V aRαi(Xi))]
exists such that
RV aRαi,βi(fi(Xi)) = RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)).
First, we consider the simpler case i > l. Here, βi = 0 and hence Mi = fi(V aRαi(Xi)).
Now, let i ≤ l. Independently of Mi it holds
RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)) ≤ RV aRαi,βi(Xi) <∞
since Xi ∈ L1. Furthermore, Mi 7→ kfi(V aRs(Xi)) is a continuous function for every s. Hence
we obtain continuity of
Mi 7→ RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)) =
1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
kfi(V aRs(Xi))ds. (4.7)
Since fi ∈ C, the monotonicity of Rfi implies for all x ≥ V aRαi+βi(Xi) that
fi(x) ≤ x− V aRαi+βi(Xi) + fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi))
=
(
x− (V aRαi+βi(Xi)− fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi))))
+
(4.8)
Thus for Mi = fi (V aRαi(Xi)) it follows from (4.8) and the properties of V aRαi that
RV aRαi,βi(fi(Xi)) =
1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
V aRs(fi(Xi))ds =
1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
fi(V aRs(Xi))ds
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≤ 1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
kfi(V aRs(Xi))ds
=
1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
V aRs(kfi(Xi))ds = RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)). (4.9)
Conversely, for Mi = V aRαi+βi(fi(Xi)) it holds
RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)) = V aRαi+βi(fi(Xi)) ≤ RV aRαi,βi(fi(Xi)). (4.10)
In view of the continuity of (4.7) together with (4.9) and (4.10), the intermediate value theo-
rem ensures the existence of Mi ∈ [fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi)), fi(V aRαi(Xi))] such that the statement
RV aRαi,βi(fi(Xi)) = RV aRαi,βi(kfi(Xi)) follows. 
The reinsurance treaties kfi can be used to reduce the aggregate capital requirement of all
insurers.
Proposition 4.6. Assume (A2), (A3) and let f1, . . . , fn ∈ C be arbitrary ceded loss functions.
Then
n∑
i=1
RV aRαi,βi
(
Rkfi (Xi)
)
+ pi
( n∑
i=1
kfi(Xi)
)
≤
n∑
i=1
RV aRαi,βi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
+ pi
( n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
.
Proof. First, let i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. The retained loss functions Rfi(x) = x − fi(x) and Rkfi (x) =
x − kfi(x) are increasing continuous as fi, kfi ∈ C. Hence, by the properties of V aRαi and the
definition of kfi
RV aRαi,βi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
=
1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
V aRs(Xi)− fi(V aRs(Xi))ds
= RV aRαi,βi(Xi)−RV aRαi,βi
(
fi(Xi)
)
= RV aRαi,βi(Xi)−RV aRαi,βi
(
kfi(Xi)
)
=
1
βi
∫ αi+βi
αi
V aRs(Xi)− kfi(V aRs(Xi))ds
= RV aRαi,βi
(
Rkfi (Xi)
)
. (4.11)
We already know from (4.8) that for x ≥ V aRαi+βi(Xi)
fi(x) ≤
(
x− (V aRαi+βi(Xi)− fi(V aRαi+βi(Xi))))
+
=: kˆfi(x).
Since kfi(x) = min{kˆfi(x),Mi} and∫ αi+βi
αi
fi(V aRs(Xi))ds =
∫ αi+βi
αi
kfi(V aRs(Xi))ds, (4.12)
which holds by the choice of Mi, there is an x0 ∈ [V aRαi+βi(Xi), V aRαi(Xi)] such that
fi(x) ≤ kfi(x) for x ∈ [V aRαi+βi(Xi), x0]
fi(x) ≥ kfi(x) for x ∈ (x0, V aRαi(Xi)].
(4.13)
Now let U ∼ U([αi, αi + βi]). Then by (4.12)
E[fi(V aRU (Xi))] = E[kfi(V aRU (Xi))]. (4.14)
This together with (4.13) fulfils the assumptions of Proposition 2.4 c) and we therefore have
kfi(V aRU (Xi)) ≤icx fi(V aRU (Xi)). (4.15)
Analogous to (4.8) one obtains
kfi(x) ≤ fi(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ V aRαi+βi(Xi) (4.16)
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and as fi is increasing it follows from (4.13)
kfi(x) ≤ fi(x) for x ≥ V aRαi(Xi). (4.17)
Next, let V ∼ U([0, 1]). Then Xi ∼ F−1Xi (1− V ) = V aRV (Xi) and consequently
E
[
(kfi(Xi)− d)+
]
= E
[
(kfi(V aRV (Xi))− d)+
]
=
∫
[0,αi)∪(αi+βi,1]
(kfi(V aRv(Xi))− d)+dv +
∫ αi+βi
αi
(kfi(V aRv(Xi))− d)+dv
=
∫
[0,αi)∪(αi+βi,1]
(kfi(V aRv(Xi))− d)+dv + βiE
[
(kfi(V aRU (Xi))− d)+
]
≤
∫
[0,αi)∪(αi+βi,1]
(fi(V aRv(Xi))− d)+dv + βiE
[
(fi(V aRU (Xi))− d)+
]
= E
[
(fi(V aRV (Xi))− d)+
]
= E
[
(fi(Xi)− d)+
]
,
where the inequality is due to (4.15), (4.16) and (4.17). Hence we have kfi(Xi) ≤icx fi(Xi).
We now consider the remaining indices. Let i ∈ {l+ 1, . . . , n}. From the proof of Proposition
4.2 together with Proposition 4.5 it follows that we have kfi(Xi) = hfi(Xi) ≤icx fi(Xi) for these
indices, too.
For all i = 1, . . . , n the functions kfi and fi are in C, i.e. increasing and continuous. Thus by
(A2), the random vectors
kf (X) :=
(
kf1(X1), . . . , kfn(Xn)
)
and f(X) :=
(
f1(X1), . . . , fn(Xn)
)
have the same PDS copula as X = (X1, . . . , Xn). Hence, by Theorem 2.11
n∑
i=1
kfi(Xi) ≤icx
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi). (4.18)
Finally, (4.11) and the fact that pi is consistent with the increasing convex order by (A3) together
with (4.18) yields the assertion. 
The main result of this section is given in the next theorem. The proof follows with Proposition
4.6 in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.7. Under assumptions (A2), (A3), the optimal reinsurance problem (3.3) has the
same optimal value as the finite dimensional problem
min
n∑
i=1
ai +
l∑
i=1
RV aRαi,βi
(
(Xi − ai − bi)+
)
+ pi
(
n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − ai)+, bi}
)
s.t. 0 ≤ ai ≤ V aRαi+βi(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n
ai + bi ≥ V aRαi+βi(Xi), i = 1, . . . , l (4.19)
bi = V aRαi(Xi)− ai, i = l + 1, . . . , n.
Furthermore, if a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn is an optimal solution to (4.19) then
fi(x) = min{(x− ai)+, bi}, i = 1, . . . , n
is an optimal solution to (3.3).
Remark 4.8. Note that in the setting of Theorem 4.7 an optimal solution exists, when pi
is Lipschitz continuous and for all i = 1, . . . , n it holds αi > 0 or Xi bounded. We have
ai ∈ [0, V aRαi+βi(Xi)] and bi ∈ [0, V aRαi(Xi)]. Note that V aRαi+βi(Xi) <∞ since we required
0 < αi + βi from the beginning and V aRαi(Xi) <∞ holds if and only if αi > 0 or Xi bounded.
Thus the target function is minimized over a compact set. Moreover, pi is Lipschitz-continuous
w.r.t. the supremum norm and applied to bounded random variables. Finally for monotone,
translation invariant risk measures ρ we obtain since (x − c)+ ≤ x+ + |c| that ρ((X − d)+) −
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ρ((X− c)+) ≤ ρ((X− c)+ + |c−d|)+−ρ((X− c)+) = |c−d|. Hence RV aRαi,βi
(
(Xi−ai− bi)+
)
is Lipschitz-continuous in ai, bi which implies the result.
5. When is the Social Optimum also Optimal for the Individual?
When we choose n = 1 then the optimization problem (3.3) reduces to
min ρ
(
Rf (X)
)
+ pi
(
f(X)
)
s.t. f ∈ C. (5.1)
This problem can be interpreted as one where the individual insurance company is seeking for
optimal reinsurance: Rf (X) is the retained risk which is evaluated with the risk measure ρ and
pi
(
f(X)
)
is the premium charged by the reinsurer. In this section we will discuss when the social
optimum obtained by solving (3.3) coincides with the individually optimal reinsurance treaties
obtained by solving (5.1) for each single company i = 1, . . . , n.
5.1. pi is the expected value premium principle. An obvious case where both optimal
reinsurance treaties coincide occurs when pi is the expected value premium principle i.e. pi(X) =
(1 + θ)E[X] with θ ≥ 0. Here we obtain
pi
(
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
pi
(
fi(Xi)
)
which implies that the global optimization problem separates into local ones. Note that pi is not
translation-invariant.
5.2. Comonotonicity together with a comonotone additive pi. Another simple case arises
when the risks X1, . . . , Xn have the upper Fre´chet copula and pi is comonotone additive. Wang
premium principles are for example comonotone additive (see e.g. [24]). For a risk X ∈ L1 they
are defined as
pi(X) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
g(SX(x))dx
where g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] increasing with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 is the distortion function and
θ ≥ 0. In this setting we obtain again that
pi
(
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
pi
(
fi(Xi)
)
since fi are increasing and thus preserve the copula.
5.3. Independent risks together with exponential premium principle pi. Suppose the
risks X1, . . . , Xn are independent and pi is the exponential premium principle, i.e.
pi(X) =
1
γ
log
(
E[eγX ]
)
where γ > 0 is the risk sensitivity parameter. In this setting we obtain again
pi
(
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
pi
(
fi(Xi)
)
which implies that the global optimization problem separates into local ones. For other appli-
cations pi is also referred to as entropic risk measure.
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5.4. Individual risk measures are Value-at-Risk and pi is Lipschitz with constant 1.
When all insurers measure their retained risk with Value-at-Risk, we know from Theorem 4.3
that it suffices to find an optimal solution (a1, . . . , an) of the finite dimensional optimization
problem
min
n∑
i=1
ai + pi
(
n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}
)
s.t. 0 ≤ ai ≤ V aRαi(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n.
(5.2)
in order to obtain optimal insurance treaties, which are then given by
fi(x) = min{(x− ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}, i = 1, . . . , n.
The following proposition shows that a general solution can be obtained independently from the
specific copula and marginal distributions of X = (X1, . . . , Xn) as well as the specific premium
principle used by the reinsurance company.
Proposition 5.1. If all insurers use Value-at-Risk and pi satisfies (A1) and is Lipschitz with
constant 1, an optimal solution to (4.5) is given by
(a1, . . . , an) = (0, . . . , 0)
and hence the reinsurance treaties
fi(x) = min{x, V aRαi(Xi)}, i = 1, . . . , n
are an optimal solution to (3.3).
Proof. Let us denote the objective function by
Q(a1, . . . , an) =
n∑
i=1
ai + pi
( n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}
)
.
We show that Q is increasing which implies the assertion. First, note that the function min{(x−
ai)+, V aRαi(Xi) − ai} is decreasing in ai for all x ∈ [0,∞), i = 1, . . . , n. Since the premium
principle pi satisfies (A1),
q(a1, . . . , an) := pi
( n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai}
)
is a decreasing function. Now let 0 ≤ a = (a1, . . . , an) ≤ (b1, . . . , bn) = b componentwise. By
‖ · ‖ we denote the supremum norm and by ‖ · ‖1 the L1-norm. We have
Q(a1, . . . , an) ≤ Q(b1, . . . , bn)
⇔ q(a1, . . . , an)− q(b1, . . . , bn) ≤
n∑
i=1
bi − ai
⇔ |q(a1, . . . , an)− q(b1, . . . , bn)| ≤ ‖b− a‖1, (5.3)
where the last equivalence holds as q is decreasing and a ≤ b. Hence, it suffices to show (5.3).
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be arbitrary. For x ≥ V aRαi(Xi) it holds
0 ≤min{(x− ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai} −min{(x− bi)+, V aRαi(Xi)− bi}
=V aRαi(Xi)− ai − V aRαi(Xi) + bi = bi − ai
(5.4)
and for x < V aRαi(Xi)
0 ≤min{(x− ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai} −min{(x− bi)+, V aRαi(Xi)− bi}
=

x− ai − x+ bi = bi − ai, bi ≤ x
x− ai − 0 ≤ bi − ai, ai ≤ x < bi
0− 0 ≤ bi − ai, x < ai.
(5.5)
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It follows
|q(a1, . . . , an)− q(b1, . . . , bn)|
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai} −min{(Xi − bi)+, V aRαi(Xi)− bi}
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
n∑
i=1
‖min{(Xi − ai)+, V aRαi(Xi)− ai} −min{(Xi − bi)+, V aRαi(Xi)− bi}‖
≤
n∑
i=1
bi − ai = ‖b− a‖1,
which is exactly (5.3). The first inequality is due to the Lipschitz continuity of pi, the second
one by the triangular inequality and last one by (5.4), (5.5). 
Note that every monotone and translation invariant premium principle is Lipschitz with con-
stant 1. Theorem 5.1 implies that the social optimum coincides with the individual optimum.
5.5. A Case where Things are Different. After so many examples showing that the social
optimum coincides with the individual optimum one might wonder how examples look like where
this is not the case. Since we want to discuss such a case analytically and not only numerically
we make some assumptions to simplify the model.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that ρ1 = . . . = ρn = ρ, ρ is positive homogeneous and comonotone
additive, pi is positive homogeneous and subadditive and X1, . . . , Xn are identically distributed
and have a symmetric copula. Then whenever optimal reinsurance treaties f∗1 , . . . , f∗n ∈ C exist,
there is a symmetric solution f∗1 = . . . = f∗n = f∗.
Proof. Let us denote the objective function for f1, . . . , fn ∈ C by
Q(f1, . . . , fn) =
n∑
i=1
ρi
(
Rfi(Xi)
)
+ pi
(
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi)
)
and suppose that (f∗1 , . . . , f∗n) is an optimal solution. We will show that then (f∗, . . . , f∗) with
f∗(x) := 1n
∑n
i=1 f
∗
i (x) is also optimal.
First it is not difficult to see that due to our assumption Q is symmetric, i.e.
Q(f1, . . . , fn) = Q(fσ(1), . . . , fσ(n))
where σ is any permutation of the numbers 1, . . . , n. Thus we obtain with the positive homo-
geneity and subadditivity of pi and with the positive homogeneity and comonotone additivity of
ρ that
Q(f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
n) =
1
n!
∑
σ
Q(f∗σ(1), . . . , f
∗
σ(n))
=
1
n!
∑
σ
(
ρ(X1 − f∗σ(1)(X1)) + . . .+ ρ(Xn − f∗σ(n)(Xn))
+pi(f∗σ(1)(X1) + . . .+ f
∗
σ(n)(Xn))
)
=
∑
σ
(
ρ(
1
n!
X1 − 1
n!
f∗σ(1)(X1)) + . . .+ ρ(
1
n!
Xn − 1
n!
f∗σ(n)(Xn))
+pi(
1
n!
f∗σ(1)(X1) + . . .+
1
n!
f∗σ(n)(Xn))
)
≥ ρ(X1 − 1
n!
∑
σ
f∗σ(1)(X1)
)
+ . . .+ ρ
(
Xn − 1
n!
∑
σ
f∗σ(n)(Xn)
)
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+pi
( 1
n!
∑
σ
f∗σ(1)(X1) + . . .+
1
n!
∑
σ
f∗σ(n)(Xn)
)
= ρ
(
X1 − f∗(X1)
)
+ . . .+ ρ
(
Xn − f∗(Xn)
)
+ pi
(
f∗(X1) + . . .+ f∗(Xn)
)
= Q(f∗, . . . , f∗).
Thus, using f∗ as reinsurance treaty for all insurance companies is also optimal. 
In order to demonstrate how the social and individual optimum can differ, we consider iden-
tically distributed, binary risks occuring for instance in term life insurance. Due to positive
homogeneity of ρ and pi we may assume Bernoulli distributions for all insurers. A standard way
to describe the dependence structure of such risks is a Bernoulli mixture model: We assume
that the individual risks can be decomposed into a common economic (or systemic) risk factor
Z ∈ (0, 1) and independent idiosyncratic components, i.e. let
X1, . . . , Xn | Z iid∼ Bin(1, Z).
As risk measures we take ρi = V aRα for i = 1, . . . , n and an arbitrary premium principle from
the large class of Wang premium principles
pi(X) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
g(SX(x))dx,
with concave distortion function g. It holds
V aRα(Xi) =
{
1, α < E[Z]
0, α ≥ E[Z]
for i = 1, . . . , n. Excluding trivial cases we assume α < E[Z]. Our example fulfills the as-
sumptions of Proposition 5.2. Hence, it suffices to consider symmetric solutions to the optimal
reinsurance problem (3.3). By Theorem 4.3 we have to solve
min na+ pi
(
n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − a)+, 1− a}
)
such that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
Set N =
∑n
i=1Xi. It is easy to see that P(N = k) =
(
n
k
) ∫ 1
0 z
k(1 − z)n−kdFZ(z) =: pn,k.
Calculating the premium principle explicitly, one obtains
pi
(
n∑
i=1
min{(Xi − a)+, 1− a}
)
= (1− a)pi
(
n∑
i=1
Xi
)
= (1− a)(1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
g(SN (x))dx
= (1− a)(1 + θ)
n∑
k=1
g
 n∑
j=k
pn,j

Thus, it is socially optimal that all risks are fully ceded if
1 > (1 + θ)
1
n
n∑
k=1
g
 n∑
j=k
pn,j

and no reinsurance is purchased otherwise. Considering the individual optimum (n = 1), one
obtains the respective ceding condition
1 > (1 + θ)g (p1,1) = (1 + θ)g (E[Z]) .
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Since g is concave we have
1
n
n∑
k=1
g
 n∑
j=k
pn,j
 ≤ g
 1
n
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=k
pn,j
 (5.6)
= g
(
1
n
∫ ∞
0
SN (x)dx
)
= g
(
1
n
E[N ]
)
= g (E[Z]) .
Whenever (5.6) is strict it may happen that an individually rational insurer retains the full risk
even though it would be socially optimal to cede.
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